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Verbal deception detection has gained momentum as a technique to tell truth‐tellers
from liars. At the same time, researchers' degrees of freedom make it hard to assess
the robustness of effects. Replication research can help evaluate how reproducible
an effect is. We present the first replication in verbal deception research whereby
ferry passengers were instructed to tell the truth or lie about their travel plans. The
original study found truth‐tellers to include more specific time references in their
answers. The replication study that closely mimicked the setting, procedure, materials,
coding, and analyses found no lie–truth difference for specific time references.
Although the power of our replication study was suboptimal (0.77), Bayesian statistics
showed evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Given the great applied conse-
quences of verbal credibility tests, we hope this first replication attempt ignites much
needed preregistered, high‐powered, multilab replication efforts.
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In the challenge to tell truth‐tellers from liars, verbal deception detection
has emerged as one of the more promising approaches (Oberlader et al.,
2016; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2015). Verbal deception detection sets out to
identify verbal indicators of deception in statementsmade about an event.
Based on the notion that liars will have more difficulty providing a con-
vincing and hence detailed account of a fabricated event than truth‐tellers,
the cognitive approach to deception postulates that the differences in dif-
ficulty are represented in, for example, the richness of the verbal account
about the event (Vrij et al., 2015). Similarly, the theory of Reality Monitor-
ing poses that the content of a statement about a genuinely experienced
event can be recalled in more detail than the content of a fabricated event
(Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998). Both the cognitive approach and Real-
ity Monitoring agree on the prediction that truthful statements are richer
in detail than deceptive statements. There is a body of research on the ver-
bal deception detection approachwithmeta‐analytical findings suggesting- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
y Published by John Wiley & Sonsthat detail richness can identify liars and truth‐tellers better than chance
(Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Oberlader et al., 2016; Vrij
et al., 2015). However, meta‐analyses rely on the quality of the original
studies and cannot ascertain whether the individual effects reported in
studies are reliable (van Elk et al., 2015). For progress in the field of verbal
deception detection, replication studies are needed to solidify the findings
and to work towards a strong empirical fundament that practitioners can
apply. In other words, replication efforts are just as important as new,
exploratory studies: “innovation points out paths that are possible; replica-
tion points out paths that are likely; progress relies on both” (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015, p. 7).1.1 | Replicating verbal deception detection research
The importance of replication research was shown by a landmark
finding that only one third to one half of 100 psychological experi-
ments replicated (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). A replication study- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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studies are those that test a previously found effect under new circum-
stances, taking into account the key ingredients that are believed tomat-
ter. A direct replication aims to mimic the original study as closely as
possible (Simons, 2014). For any effect to matter, it should be obtainable
under similar circumstances. That is if experiment X finds an effect, a new
experiment Y following the procedure, sample size, and analysis of X
should be able to see that same effect. The field of verbal deception
detection is characterized by a multitude of interviewing techniques
(e.g., asking difficult questions vs. open recall), cues (e.g., plausibility, con-
sistency, and richness of detail), coding of those cues (e.g., what counts as
a detail), annotation methods (e.g., manual human annotation and auto-
mated information extraction), and analytical approaches (e.g., individual
cues vs. predictive modelling with multiple cues). These elements allow
for high researchers' degrees of freedom (Gelman & Loken, 2013), that
is, aspects on which the researcher has to make decisions when
conducting a study and presenting results. The resulting variation
between studies makes it hard to assess how robust the effects found
in verbal deception detection are. In the current paper, we, therefore,
present the first replication of verbal deception detection research.1.2 | The original study
We aimed to replicate the second experiment of Warmelink, Vrij,
Mann, and Granhag (2013). Eighty‐four participants (36 male; mean
age 58 years, SD = 12.6) were instructed to either tell the truth or lie
about the reasons for travelling on a 6‐hr‐long ferry trip between Ports-
mouth (UK) andCaen (France). Participants were approached by an inter-
viewer blind to the experimental condition and were asked either a
control question (“Please describe in as much detail as possible what
you are going to do today at your destination”) or a temporal prompt
question (“Please describe what your timetable is for today at your desti-
nation”). The answers (word countM = 33.7, SD = 20.71) were manually
annotated by two independent, trained human judges on specific times
(e.g., “half past seven” and “five o'clock”), temporal details (e.g., “earlier”
and “1 hour”), and spatial details (e.g., “in Paris” to “to London”). Truthful
answers contained more mentions of specific times than deceptive
answers (d = 0.54; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.10; 0.99). We chose
the effect found for specific times for replication because (a) the very
short interview (47 s) is attractive for applied purposes, (b) the dependent
measure of specific times iswell‐automatable (Kleinberg,Mozes, Arntz, &
Verschuere, 2017), and (c) the effect size is promising for a field charac-
terized by relatively small effects (DePaulo et al., 2003).1.3 | The current study: Direct replication part
We replicated the time prompt question findings from the second exper-
iment inWarmelink et al. (2013). The study was conducted on a ferry on
the Dutch islands, and participants were interviewed in Dutch. We
extended the original experiment to further test whether actively
eliciting specific information benefitted deception detection. Note that
the additional question came after the replication part so that it could
not affect the replication. Our first hypothesis is directly taken from the
original study and states that truthful answers to the time schedulequestion contain a higher proportion of specific time occurrences than
deceptive answers.1.4 | The current study: Additional question and
coding
Apart from the direct replication part, we also examined whether the
proportion of spatial details is higher in truthful than deceptive
answers on an additional route description question. Similar to the
prompt question mechanism for specific time references in the
original study (i.e., asking for specific times enlarges truth–lie
differences), asking for a route description might be helpful to invoke
truth–lie differences on an additional dimension, namely, spatial
details. Because the majority of verbal deception research resorts
to humans who count the occurrences of verbal indicators, we fur-
ther added two conceptually identical hypotheses on the related,
computationally extracted constructs (temporal and spatial details).
We expected that the proportion of “time” and “space” references
as extracted with word count software is higher in truthful than in
deceptive answers for questions on the respective domain (i.e., the
time schedule and the route question). The procedure, manipulations,
hypotheses, and analyses for the current study were preregistered
before data collection (accessible at https://osf.io/w9qe2/register/
565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67). The materials, data, and code are
available at https://osf.io/t29dz/. This paper reports all measures,
conditions, data exclusions, and considerations to determine the
sample size as stated in the preregistration.2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
We approached participants on a ferry and interviewed them about their
plans at their destination.We collected data frompassengers on the ferry
from the Dutch mainland (Harlingen) to the Dutch island Terschelling,
which took approximately 120 min. Similar to the original study, willing-
ness to participate was high with more than 80% of approached partici-
pants agreeing to partake. We aimed to collect data for the identical
sample size as the original study (n = 84). As stated in the preregistration,
this sample size is nearly identical to the one reached with a priori statis-
tical power analysis for the key to‐be‐replicated effect size of d = 0.54
(one‐sided t test, alpha significance level 0.05, and power of 0.80,
required n = 88). Our initial sample consisted of 85 participants, of whom
six were excluded because they did not follow the instructions properly
(e.g., they were not lying in the deceptive condition). Our final sample
consisted of 79 participants, randomly assigned to either the truthful
(n = 41, 39.47% female, Mage = 45.51 years, SDage = 18.39) or deceptive
condition (n = 38, 41.46% female, Mage = 45.95 years, SDage = 14.68).
There was no difference between the two conditions in gender,
X2(1) = 1.00, p = 0.999, or age, F (1, 77) = 0.01, p = 0.908.2.2 | Design
The design of this experiment is 2 (Veracity: truthful vs. deceptive,
between‐subjects) by 2 (Question focus: time schedule vs. route
594 KLEINBERG ET AL.description, within‐subjects) with the proportion of human‐coded spe-
cific times as key dependent variable. The focus of the replication is on
the time schedule questions identical to the original study's “time
prompt” condition.
Additional dependent variables—as outlined in the preregistration
—are the proportion of human‐coded spatial details, as well as the
automatically coded proportion of temporal and spatial details. As a
control, we also asked for participants' motivation to be convincing.2.3 | Procedure
Two experimenters gathered the data on the ferry boat on 4 days in
2017. The experimenters approached participants for voluntary
participation in a “deception detection experiment.” All
experimenter–participant interaction was in Dutch. Experimenter 1
approached the participants, asked whether they were willing to partici-
pate, and had them sign the informed consent form. Before participants
were allocated to either the truthful or deceptive condition, Experi-
menter 1 established the ground truth by asking the participants what
their plans at their destinations were (e.g., “going home” and “weekend
trip toTerschelling”) and asked for the participants' age andwhether they
had made the trip before. All participants were randomly assigned to the
truthful or deceptive condition—participants chose an envelope from a
shuffled stack of all envelopes containing the instructions for truth‐tellers
or liars. The participants read the instructions according to their condition
in the envelope as follows: “You are in the truth condition. In a fewminutes,
an interviewer will ask you a few questions about your trip. Your task is to tell
the truth about what you are going to do at your trip's destination. Try to
convince the interviewer that you are telling the truth. There will be no fol-
low‐up questions” (truthful condition); and “You are in the lie condition. In
a few minutes, an interviewer will ask you a few questions about your trip.
Your task is to lie about what you are really going to do at your trip's desti-
nation and to pretend that you are travelling for a different reason. Try to
convince the interviewer that you are telling the truth. There will be no fol-
low‐up questions” (deceptive condition).
Each participant had 3 min of preparation time before the second
experimenter (i.e., the interviewer) arrived.
The interview consisted of two brief questions. The first one (time
schedule question) was focused on the temporal aspects of the journey,
and the interview question was identical (translated to Dutch) to the one
asked in the original experiment: “Please describe in as much detail as
possible what your timetable is for today at your destination.”
The additional question that we added (route description ques-
tion) targeted spatial aspects of the trip and concerned the route
description from the moment the participant got off the ferry boatTABLE 1 Examples of statements high and low in specific times and spa
High
Specific times (Question 1) “I arrive at circa twelve o'clock, then I'll unp
make my room. […] Then, at three o'cloc
working until half past four. Then we wi
have a small bite and work until nine o'c
Spatial details (Question 2) “Ehm. I arrive in West‐Terschelling. There I
the ferry and walk along the Hoofdweg [
through the small villages to Midsland. […
Note. The respective category coding is highlighted in bold.to their destination (“Please describe the route from when you leave
the boat to your destination”). Each interview was audio‐recorded
and later transcribed. After the interview, the experimenter asked
for the participants' motivation to provide a convincing story (from 1
—very low—to 10—very high), to recall their veracity instructions,
and noted the participants' gender.2.4 | Human coding of statements
The transcribed interviews were coded by two independent and
trained human judges. Before coding the actual transcripts, both
coders received a detailed 3‐hr training session on practicing statements
from a different study (but also on truthful and deceptive intentions) with
one of the authors (B. K.). The annotation guidelines were identical to
those used in the original study. After discussing annotation inconsis-
tencies, the two judges annotated another six full statements of which
the annotation was approved by the lead author of the original study
and coauthor of the current paper (L. W.). We instructed the coders to
annotate and count the number of specific time occurrences (e.g., “quar-
ter past one”) using verbatim the same instructions from the original
experiment. For the additional hypothesis and the exploratory part, the
coders also counted the number of spatial details (e.g., “next to” and
“down”) and the number of temporal details (e.g., “after,” “before,” and
“subsequently”). To assess the reliability of the coding procedure, we
had the first coder score 40% of the statements and the second coder
score all statements. The agreement between the two human judges
was high (specific time: Pearson correlation coefficient r = 0.90, intraclass
correlation ICC = 0.86, p < 0.001; spatial details: r = 0.92, ICC = 0.89,
p < 0.001; temporal details: r = 0.68, ICC = 0.71, p < 0.001). For the anal-
ysis, we used the judgments of the second coder and standardized the
count variables (specific times, spatial, and temporal details) by the word
count of each statement per question type (seeTable 1 for examples high
and low in human coded variables).2.5 | Automated coding of statements
An alternative to human judgments is the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) software (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn,
2015). The LIWC counts how many words per input text belong to
predefined psycholinguistic lexicon categories and has been used for
verbal deception research before (e.g., Bond et al., 2017). For the cur-
rent experiment, we used the categories “time” (e.g., “once” and “since”)
and “space” (e.g., “above” and “outside”) each of which is standardized
by theword count per statement and question type.We used theDutch






“Well, I'll arrive soon and will then rent a bike to
at the tourist office. I'll cycle until quarter to
four and then go back to the mainland. Then




“Driving the car as fast as we can. No, just joking,
I don't want another fine. We take the car to Elst.”
TABLE 2 Means (SDs) per dependent variable, veracity, and question focus
Dependent variable
Time schedule question Route description question
Truthful Deceptive Truthful Deceptive
Human‐coded specific times 0.88 (1.67) 1.14 (1.82) 0.04 (0.23) 0.04 (0.25)
Human‐coded spatial details 4.83 (2.68) 6.70 (3.59) 10.08 (6.67) 12.60 (5.17)
LIWC‐coded temporal details 6.73 (3.93) 6.07 (4.62) 4.44 (4.48) 4.37 (3.84)
LIWC‐coded spatial details 1.80 (2.28) 2.75 (2.87) 2.96 (3.51) 3.82 (3.17)
Human‐coded temporal details 8.12 (4.35) 7.87 (4.37) 5.26 (4.23) 5.36 (3.94)
Number of words 58.32 (32.90) 58.13 (30.51) 49.90 (23.11) 42.61 (34.65)
Note. LIWC: Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count.
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3.1 | Preregistered analyses
3.1.1 | Replication
For the sake of exactly replicating the original analysis, we first tested
for the Veracity main effect for the time schedule question only. There
was no significant difference in specific time references between
truthful and deceptive answers, tone‐sided(74.97) = −0.64, p = 0.262,
d = −0.14 [95% CI: −0.59; 0.30].1
The 2 (Veracity: truthful vs. deceptive, between‐subjects) by 2
(Question focus: time schedule vs. route description) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the proportion of human‐coded “spe-
cific times” showed no significant main effect of Veracity, F (1,
77) = 0.41, p = 0.525, f = 0.07, and no significant Veracity*Question
focus interaction, F (1, 77) = 0.40, p = 0.528, f = 0.07. A significant
main effect of Question focus, F (1, 77) = 23.61, p < 0.001,
f = 0.55, indicated that answers to the time schedule question
(M = 1.01, SD = 1.74) contained more specific times than those on
the route description question (M = 0.04, SD = 0.24, seeTable 2). Thus,
although the time question elicited more specific time answers than
the route question, we did not find that the time schedule question
elicited more specific times in truth‐tellers than in liars.3.1.2 | Additional measure: Motivation
Participants were highly motivated to provide a convincing story, and
the self‐reported motivation (on a scale from 0 to 10) did not differ
between the two Veracity conditions (truthful: M = 8.37, SD = 1.18;
deceptive: M = 8.17, SD = 0.97), F (1, 77) = 0.64, p = 0.428,
f = 0.09. The majority of participants had made the trip before at least
once (82.28%), but this did not differ between the two conditions,
X2(1) = 1, p = 0.999 (liars: 82.58%; truth‐tellers: 82.94%).1Note that we standardized for the word count (as per the preregistration). In
the original study, the dependent variable was not divided by the number of
words, but instead the number of words was added as a covariate. Including
word count as a covariate in an analysis of the uncorrected dependent variable
did not change the results. There was no significant main effect of Veracity,
F (1, 76) = 0.08, p = 0.785, f = 0.03; despite the significant effect of the covar-
iate “word count,” F (1, 76) = 9.97, p = 0.002, f = 0.36. When we use the non-
standardized values for the replication analysis (t test), we obtain very similar
results, tone‐sided(67.10) = −0.26, p = 0.396, d = −0.06 [95% CI: −0.50; 0.38].3.1.3 | Beyond replication: Additional (route)
question
The 2 by 2 mixed ANOVA on the proportion of human‐coded spatial
details indicated a significant main effect of Veracity, F (1, 77) = 8.68,
p = 0.004, f = 0.36, suggesting that—contrary to the expectation—
deceptive answers (M = 9.65, SD = 6.10) contained more spatial
details than truthful ones (M = 7.46, SD = 4.87) regardless of Question
focus. A significant main effect of Question focus, F (1, 77) = 52.51,
p < 0.001, f = 0.82, showed that answers to the route description
question (M = 11.29, SD = 6.04) contained more spatial details than
those to the time schedule question (M = 5.73, SD = 3.27). The interac-
tion was not significant, F (1, 77) = 0.18, p = 0.674, f = 0.05.
3.1.4 | Beyond replication: Additional (computerized)
coding
For the LIWC‐coded temporal details, there was only a significant
Question focus main effect, F (1, 77) = 10.24, p = 0.002, f = 0.36,
showing that there were more temporal details for the time schedule
question (M = 6.41, SD = 4.26) than for the route description question
(M = 4.41, SD = 4.16). There was no significant Veracity main effect,
F (1, 77) = 0.26, p = 0.613, f = 0.06, nor a significant Veracity by
Question focus interaction, F (1, 77) = 0.22, p = 0.639, f = 0.05.
Likewise, for the LIWC‐coded spatial details, there was no
Veracity main effect, F (1, 77) = 3.04, p = 0.085, f = 0.20, and no
significant interaction effect between Veracity and Question focus,
F (1, 77) = 0.01, p = 0.911, f = 0.01. A significant Question focus
main effect, F (1, 77) = 6.94, p = 0.010, f = 0.30, indicated that
answers to the route description question contained more spatial
details, (M = 3.37, SD = 3.34) than to the time schedule question
(M = 2.26, SD = 2.61).4 | NON‐PREREGISTERED ANALYSES
4.1 | Bayesian hypothesis testing
4.1.1 | Uninformed priors
An alternative way of testing the findings is using Bayesian
statistics, which is better equipped of capturing uncertainty in the data
(e.g., due to small sample sizes, Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) and is
therefore able to provide more reliable estimates of, for example,
mean differences between groups (Wagenmakers, Wetzels,
Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011; Wetzels et al., 2011). Moreover,
596 KLEINBERG ET AL.Bayesian testing quantifies how likely the data are under two compet-
ing hypotheses and can, therefore, indicate evidence for the null
hypothesis. Using Bayesian hypothesis testing with the BayesFactor
R package using default, uninformed priors (Morey, Rouder, Love, &
Marwick, 2015), the present study's results for the key effect indi-
cated a Bayes factor, BF01 = 3.57 (i.e., that data were 3.57 times more
likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis).
This Bayes factor can be interpreted as substantial evidence for the
null hypothesis that the truthful statements do not differ from decep-
tive ones over the alternative hypothesis (Wagenmakers et al., 2011).
In the original study, there was substantial evidence in favor of the
alternative hypothesis, BF10 = 3.24.
4.1.2 | Informed priors
When one possesses evidence about the likelihood of an effect before
obtaining new data, this prior belief should be explicitly incorporated
into the Bayesian estimation. To do so, we treat the findings of the orig-
inal study as the prior evidence for the data from the replication study,
which is the posterior distribution of the original study becomes the
prior for the replication (Gronau, Ly, & Wagenmakers, 2017). In doing
so, we incorporate the belief of the original study (i.e., that there is a
moderately sized effect) into the hypothesis testing of the replication
and obtain BF01 = 24555.02—“extreme evidence” in favor of the null.
Treating the original effect size (here d = 0.54) at face value can be
misleading because most published effect sizes are overestimations of
the true effect (Gelman & Carlin, 2014; Simonsohn, 2015).2 To avoid
inflating evidence for the null hypothesis, we also calculated the
informed prior Bayes factor estimation using a corrected original
effect size of 75% (d = 0.41, BF01 = 4.23), 50% (d = 0.27, BF01 = 2.41),
25% (d = 0.14, BF01 = 1.59), and 10% of the original (d = 0.05,
BF01 = 1.33). The evidence in favor of the null is inconclusive for these
downward‐corrected priors. This suggests that with these corrected
informed priors, our current study cannot ascertain the existence or
absence of an effect that is a lot smaller than the one suggested in
the original paper.4.2 | Further analyses
4.2.1 | Temporal details
We explored whether the human‐coded temporal details (i.e., includ-
ing nonspecific time references such as “then” and “after”) could help
discriminate truthful from deceptive statements. There was only a sig-
nificant main effect of Question focus, F (1, 77) = 20.12, p < 0.001,
f = 0.51 (time schedule: M = 8.00, SD = 4.34; route: M = 5.31,
SD = 4.05).
4.2.2 | Statement length
The 2 by 2 mixed ANOVA on the number of words indicated only a
significant Question focus main effect, F (1, 77) = 11.22, p = 0.001,
f = 0.38. Answers to the time schedule question were lengthier
(M = 58.23, SD = 31.57) than to the route description question
(M = 46.39, SD = 29.71). This finding might be due to the order effects:2We thank Timothy Luke for pointing us in to that direction during the
reviewing process.To adhere to the procedure of the original experiment, the time sched-
ule question always came first.5 | DISCUSSION
This paper presents the first replication study in the field of verbal
deception detection research. The original study found that truth‐
tellers mentioned more specific times than liars when talking about a
trip they made. We were not able to find significant differences in
the occurrence of specific times between truth‐tellers and liars.5.1 | Did the findings replicate?
A judgment of the success of a direct replication should go beyond
mere statistical significance testing (Nosek & Errington, 2017; Open
Science Collaboration, 2015). We evaluate the current replication
efforts utilizing five criteria proposed by the OSC, 2015. (a) Does the
replication produce a statistically significant effect in the same direction
as the original? No. The original experiment yielded a significant differ-
ence in specific times, so that truthful statements contained more than
deceptive ones (d = 0.54), whereas the replication effect albeit nonsig-
nificant was in the opposite direction (d = −0.14). (b) Is the effect size in
the replication similar to the effect size in the original? No. The original
study showed a medium effect (Cohen's f = 0.27; Cohen's d = 0.54),
whereas we obtained no significant effect ( f = 0.07; d = −0.14).
Bayesian analysis suggested that there was substantial (uninformed
priors: BF01 = 3.58) to extreme evidence (informed prior of original
study effect size: BF01 = 24555.02) in favor of the null hypothesis of
no truth–lie difference in specific time occurrences. This is in contrast
to the original study, which had BF10 = 3.24 indicating substantial evi-
dence in the opposite direction (i.e., in favor of the alternative hypoth-
esis). It is important to note, however, that using downward‐corrected
original effect sizes for the informed priors led to inconclusive Bayes
factors weakening the evidence for the null considerably. Neverthe-
less, these findings too would suggest that the original effect is not
replicated: The true effect is either nonexistent or substantially smaller
than suggested. (c) Does the original effect size fall within the confidence
or prediction interval of the replication (and vice versa)? No. When
recalculating the effect size of the original to Cohen's d, we obtain
an effect size of d = 0.54 with a 95% CI of [0.10; 0.99]. Compared with
the one yielded in the replication, d = −0.14 [−0.59; 0.30], we observe
that the original one does not fall into the 95% CI of the replication
effect, nor vice versa. (d) Does a meta‐analytic combination of results
from the original experiment and the replication yield a statistically signif-
icant effect? No. Although desirably conducted with many replication
studies from multiple labs replication, we ran a mini‐meta‐analysis
using the original and the replication study (Valentine, Pigott, &
Rothstein, 2010). The average effect size was d = 0.20 with a 95%
CI containing zero [−0.47; 0.88]. Bayes factor estimation for the
meta‐analytic result of the two t‐statistics indicated BF01 = 3.64—sub-
stantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that there is no meta‐
analytical effect. (e) Do the results of the original experiment and the rep-
lication appear to be consistent? This question pertains to the qualita-
tive assessment of the researcher. Each author of the present study
KLEINBERG ET AL. 597was asked “Did the results replicate the original effect?” Out of four
authors, none voted “Yes,” three voted “No,” and one voted “inconclu-
sive.” The inconclusive vote was motivated by the low power (calcu-
lated a priori for a power of 0.80; post hoc reached power for
d = 0.54: 0.77, see below). In addition to these five criteria, Bayesian
hypothesis testing tends to favor the null hypothesis over the original
hypothesis. Taken together, several assessment criteria suggest that
the original study did not replicate.5.2 | Differences between original and replication
study
We see at least three differences between the original and the replica-
tion that may explain the divergent findings. First, in the replication,
the majority of participants reported that they had made the same trip
before. This might have enabled the liars to use previous travels as a
lie. In doing so, their lie contains many truthful aspects retrieved
from previous experience. Although this is certainly ecologically valid,
it is in stark contrast to experimental deception research where the
lie is often a complete lie without resorting to previous experience
(e.g., Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2015). The low proportion
of passengers who did not make the trip before and the lack of that
information from the original study do not allow us to further explore
this explanation. The travellers' experience with their destination and
travel to it might even be a crucial moderator (e.g., Warmelink, Vrij,
Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012). Clearly, more research is needed on
this matter.
Second, an important aspect of direct replications is that of the
setting, population, and time, so that “[e]xact replications are replica-
tions of an experiment that operationalize both the independent and
the dependent variable in exactly the same way as the original study”
(Stroebe & Strack, 2014, p. 61). Although the setting (on a ferry) was
mirrored closely, one important difference could have been the
participants' native language. In the original study, participants were
interviewed in their native English language whereas the replication
did so with participants in their native Dutch language. In the absence
of evidence that the English and Dutch language differ in their preva-
lence of specific time references (for an examination of spatial refer-
ences, see Van Staden, Bowerman, & Verhelst, 2006, who show that
Dutch might be richer in spatial description grammar), we argue that
it is unlikely that the current language differences have affected the
chance of replication. Moreover, the underlying theories (e.g., Reality
Monitoring) are not limited to a particular language but rather
assume that the memory recollection processes are universal.3 Most
importantly, even if the language differences between original and
replication would have affected the occurrence of specific time refer-
ences, this should have played an equal role for truth‐tellers and liars
(see Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017).
Third, the answers given by the participants were shorter in the
original (number of words M = 33.70, SD = 20.71) than in the replica-
tion (M = 52.31, SD = 31.13). Although it is not clear what caused the3There is evidence that Reality Monitoring and Criteria‐based Content Analysis,
for example, work in Dutch participants (Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014) and the
replication study did not differ to the original in participants' language profi-
ciency (i.e., we did not interview participants in a foreign language).lengthier answers in the replication, it is possible that the differences
mentioned above played a role so that, for example, participants were
more talkative because they already made the trip. Importantly, how-
ever, that difference in answer length should not have lowered that
chance for replication as lengthier statements are typically better
suited for verbal deception detection than shorter ones (Vrij et al.,
2015) and several methods are specifically designed to elicit lengthier
and richer verbal accounts (e.g., the model statement technique,
Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Lafferty, & Nahari, 2017).
Despite the seemingly minor (or no) detrimental effects of poten-
tial slight deviations for the original, it cannot be established whether
these minor variations combined made the replication less likely. In the
absence of evidence that such slight variations could have affected the
findings, we acknowledge this possibility but cannot suggest which
variation or which combination of variations caused the replication
failure. To our best knowledge and intention, the current replication
study is identical to the original in that we operationalized the inde-
pendent and dependent variables precisely as was done in the original.
We, therefore, deem it fair to call the replication a direct one.5.3 | Statistical power for the replication study
An important methodological aspect of replication efforts is the statis-
tical power of the replication study (i.e., the likelihood that a significant
effect of a given size—here: d = 0.54—is observed given the sample
size and alpha significance threshold, Lakens, 2013). To give the orig-
inal effect the best chance of replicating, the likelihood of detecting a
significant effect of similar size if it were there should be high (=high
statistical power). Statistical power depends not only on sample size
and the alpha threshold but also on the effect size. Because reported
effect sizes are often overestimations of a true effect (Bakker, van
Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Simonsohn, 2015), it would be desirable to
use, for example, the lower bounds of the effect size CI. In the current
study, an ideal scenario with a power of 0.95, an alpha threshold of
0.05 (or smaller), and an effect size of d = 0.10, would require at least
a sample size of 4,332 (one‐sided comparison). Simonsohn (2015) sug-
gested that the effect size used for replication sample size calculations
could best be determined by first calculating the effect size, which the
original study would have detected with a power of 0.33 (here:
d = 0.27, and required n = 588 for a power of 0.95).
Practical considerations in the current replication study led us to
decide to mirror the identical sample size of the original study, which
coincided with a priori calculations for a power of 0.80. The achieved
power was marginally smaller (0.77). However, this implies that on
average in the long run, the chance of observing the original effect if
it were there was only 0.77. This implies that a single replication
attempt, with a chance of 23% of incorrectly not detecting an existing
effect of the original size, is not enough to conclude that the effect
does not exist (at least when one would rely on the 5% significance
threshold). The latter is amplified by the conclusion that most effects
are overestimations, and hence, true to‐be‐replicated effects are
smaller than those that are reported (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). There-
fore, we can conclude that we could not replicate the original effect
of identical size but we cannot with high confidence ascertain that
the effect (i.e., more specific time references in truthful than in
598 KLEINBERG ET AL.deceptive intentions) does not exist. It is possible that such an effect
exists but that it is much smaller in magnitude (see also Gelman's “pira-
nha argument” about the unlikely coexistence of large effects in
behavioral science, Gelman, 2017). Taken together, if an effect is con-
sidered to be important (e.g., for practical or scientific reasons), higher
powered studies and more replication attempts are needed.5.4 | Additional insights
We did not obtain support for the additional hypotheses that truthful
statements contain more temporal details (human and computer‐
coded) and more spatial details (computer‐coded) than deceptive
statements. Contrary to our expectation, however, we found that
deceptive statements contained more human‐coded spatial details
than truthful ones. The framework of interpersonal Reality Monitoring
predicts that truth‐tellers can recall an event in more detail than liars
because the latter never experienced it and, therefore, have to resort
to fabrication (Johnson et al., 1998; Nahari, 2018). Liars also have
fewer cognitive resources available to produce a detailed, rich account
of the fabricated event (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Albeit in contradiction
with this notion that liars lack the cognitive resources to produce
statements as detailed as truth‐tellers, the opposite effect found for
spatial details is not an exception. Previously, it has been argued that
expected, factual questions are what liars prepare for and can, there-
fore, enrich with details (Warmelink et al., 2012). In support of that
idea, people who lied about their planned weekend activities men-
tioned more persons and more locations than those who told the truth
(Kleinberg, van der Toolen, Vrij, Arntz, & Verschuere, 2018). A working
hypothesis states that liars might overcompensate in their statements
because they are particularly inclined to appear convincing whereas
truth‐tellers assume that their truth will appear naturally. In a different
study, individual details mentioned by truth‐tellers and liars were
coded as truthful or false and a similar pattern emerged: Liars compen-
sated for their inability to provide sufficient truthful detail after a
2‐week delay by adding false details whereas truth‐tellers did not
(Nahari, 2018). To address these dynamics, the use of unexpected
questions (e.g., on the planning of the event) seems a worthwhile
addition to future research on that hypothesis.6 | CONCLUSION
Truth‐telling and lying ferry passengers did not differ significantly in
specific time references when asked about the time schedule of their
travel plans. It should be noted that both the original and the replica-
tion study only provide a point estimate of the effect. This is not
uncommon in replication research (e.g., Open Science Collaboration,
2015); however, ideally, any replication would consist of multiple,
independent replication attempts.4 In the current study, the lack of
high statistical power leaves the possibility that there exists an actual
effect. We encourage other researchers in the deception detection
community to conduct preregistered, well‐powered, multilab replica-
tion studies of the core effects of the field to consolidate the science4See: https://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/replication.of verbal deception detection. Such a collective effort will help clarify
which effects in verbal deception research are reliable.
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